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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a software implementation of Quantum Key Distribution scheme using twelve orthogonal states in a
four-state system. With the twelve states, the Sender can encode two bits classical information in one particle, and distribute
her secret key to the Receiver. This study explores quantum alternatives to traditional key distribution protocols, and involves
implementations of quantum key distribution protocol on two cases: with and without cyber-attacks (the Intercept-Resend attack).
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1. Introduction
A very important aspect we should consider is that quantum key distribution systems are perfectly safe from a
theoretical point of view, but the quantum equipment for transmission, and especially for reception, is far from being
perfect. These technical imperfections of quantum devices lead to new methods of theoretical or practical attack on
Quantum Key Distribution Systems. The unconditional security of the one-time pad algorithm6,14 was proved by
Claude Shannon15, provided that the encryption key were secret, used only once, and with the same length as the
clear text. Though the present technology does not allow the practical implementation of all types of attacks, it is very
important to consider all possible forms of attack on quantum key distribution systems, and to create at least theoretical
methods to counteract them, in order to assure the present and future unconditional security of these systems.
There are several types of attacks on quantum key distribution systems. The most important of them are as follows:
(1) Intercept/Resend (Faked-State) attacks; (2) Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attacks; (3) Man-in-the-Middle (MiM)
attacks; (4) Quantum Cloning attacks.
Intercept-Resend attack, also called Faked-State, is the most common type of attack used on Quantum Key
Distribution protocol with Four-State Systems. The security of Quantum Key Distribution systems is also given by
the efﬁcacy of the method of detection of possible attacks.
There are several methods of detection of attacks on Quantum Key Distribution Systems:
(1) The classical method – the identiﬁcation of ququarts (four-state quantum system) altered by the enemy;
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(2) Quantum Quart Bit Error Rate – the estimation of the error rate from the primary key;
(3) Bell’s inequality.
Quantum Quart Bit Error Rate consists in the calculation of the percentage of errors from the key, obtained at the
end of the quantum transmission, after the step of communication of the polarization bases from the public channel.
Quantum Quart Bit Error Rate method for detection of the enemy may be applied to most of the key distribution
systems. Each system has its own accepted error rate, and exceeding it means the intervention of an enemy.
The Quantum Key Distribution protocol with Four-State Systems continues the series of quantum protocols of
cryptographic key distribution, which was started in 1984 by Bennett-Brassard3, using quantum bi-dimensional
systems. The quantum bi-dimensional systems are represented by states of photon polarization, forming two
orthonormal bases: linear and diagonal. In Bennett-Brassard scheme, the error rate obtained is 50%.
In 1992, Bennett4 proposed a simpliﬁed Bennett-Brassard’s protocol, using a single measurement basis. The
information is encoded in two non-orthogonal directions (polarized photons at 0◦ and 45◦, respectively).
In 1998, Bruss8 proposed a key distribution protocol much more secure than the one proposed by Bennett-Brassard,
the so-called six-state scheme, using a six-state and 3 measurement bases.
In 2000, Helle Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Asher Peres5 extended the quantum key distribution protocol for the
three-state systems, the so-called qutrits. For qutrits, bases called Mutually Unbiased Bases (MUB) are used, obtained
by the application of transformed Fourier discrete. For the protocol Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Peres, 4 measurement
bases are used, each having 3 individual vectors.
In 2006, a research team from China10 proposed a key distribution scheme using quantum systems with
four-dimensions. The scheme uses four mutually unbiased bases to prepare or measure three-state particles. The
efﬁciency of the scheme has been increased to 100% recently, using the so-called measuring-basis encryption
technique.
Existing scientiﬁc studies have certiﬁed the importance of Quantum Key Distribution protocol with Four-State
systems10 as theoretically model but, until now, have not been transformed into practical application. The proposed
model completes the theoretical study demonstrating its reality and usefulness.
Based on the mathematical model of the Quantum Key Distribution protocol with Four-State systems10, the paper
presents practical results obtained as a its implementation. For the performance of this study were developed software
applications simulating Quantum Key Distribution protocol with Four-State systems in two cases: the absence and the
presence of cyber-attacks (the Intercept-Resend attack). This study aims the size of obtained cryptographic keys and
the percentage of errors of the protocol, depending on the size of the initial data.
2. Quantum Key Distribution with Four-State Systems
By Quantum Key Distribution7,9 protocol, two entities, the sender and the receiver, establish together a unique and
secure key, which may be used with a secure encryption algorithm, like one-time pad6,14. Quantum Key Distribution
uses the advantage of subatomic phenomena, so that any attempt to intercept the ququarts (four-state system) fails, and
it also alerts about the fact that an interception took place.
A classical scheme of Quantum Key Distribution protocol uses two communication channels, a classical one, and a
quantum one, and it has the following main steps:
1. The sender and the receiver generate random and independent sequences of bits.
2. The sender and the receiver use a quantum key distribution protocol to compare the sequences of bits, and to
establish together a unique and secret key.
3. The sender and the receiver perform a procedure of error correction.
4. The sender and the receiver appreciate (according to the error rate) if the transmission was intercepted by the
enemy.
5. The sender and the receiver communicate through a public channel and perform a procedure called privacy
ampliﬁcation1,2.
6. The ﬁnal secret unique and secure key is obtained.
67 Gabriela Mogos /  Procedia Computer Science  54 ( 2015 )  65 – 72 
The Quantum Key Distribution protocol with Four-State Systems10 uses twelve orthogonal states in a four-state
quantum system. Hilbert space associated to these systems has four-dimensions, and the 3 mutually unbiased bases
(MUB), each with four eigenvectors, are deﬁned as follows:
Z − MUB =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
|Z〉0 = |0〉
|Z〉1 = |1〉
|Z〉2 = |2〉
|Z〉3 = |3〉
(1)
X − MUB =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
|X〉0 = 1√4 (|0〉 + |1〉 + |2〉 + |3〉)
|X〉1 = 1√4 (|0〉 + e
2π i
4 |1〉 + e 4π i4 |2〉 + e 6π i4 |3〉)
|X〉2 = 1√4 (|0〉 + e
4π i
4 |1〉 + e 8π i4 |2〉 + e 12π i4 |3〉)
|X〉3 = 1√4 (|0〉 + e
6π i
4 |1〉 + e 12π i4 |2〉 + e 18π i4 |3〉)
(2)
Y − MUB =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
|Y 〉0 = 1√4 (e−π i |0〉 + |1〉 + |2〉 + |3〉)
|Y 〉1 = 1√4 (e−π i |0〉 + e
2π i
4 |1〉 + e 4π i4 |2〉 + e 6π i4 |3〉)
|Y 〉2 = 1√4 (e−π i |0〉 + e
4π i
4 |1〉 + e 8π i4 |2〉 + e 12π i4 |3〉)
|Y 〉3 = 1√4 (e−π i |0〉 + e
6π i
4 |1〉 + e 12π i4 |2〉 + e 18π i4 |3〉)
(3)
The quantum cryptography scheme with four-state systems has the following steps:
1. Before the beginning of the transmission, the Sender and the Receiver make an agreement that each of the twelve
vectors can carry two-bit classical information.
2. The Sender prepares a set of N single particles which have been set in one of the twelve states by using three
(X-MUB, Y-MUB, Z-MUB) measurement bases randomly. Then, the Sender sends these particles to the Receiver.
3. The Receiver randomly chooses one of the three measurement bases to measure each particle that he has received
and publicizes the measurement bases that he chose.
4. The Sender publicly reveals the position of particles in which she has chosen the same measurement bases as
Bob. They reserve these particles and discard the others.
5. At the end of Quantum Key Distribution process, the Sender and the Receiver will sacriﬁce some of them for
error correction and privacy ampliﬁcation. By estimating the error rate of the comparing results, both of them
can conclude whether the key distribution process is secure. If the quantum channel is eavesdropped, they will
discard all the particles transmitted and halt the transmission. If the process is secure, after correction and privacy
ampliﬁcation, they will share the same bits of secret key.
3. Software Implementation of Quantum Key Distribution with Four-State Systems
The purpose of our paper is to present the results obtained after the implementation of the software of this protocol,
both for the case when the protocol is secure, and for the case of a cyber-attack.
The application simulating the protocol was realized in C++ language. The equipment used in the simulation process
consists of 3 computers connected by a switch. The modules of the application will run on each of the 3 computers:
the Sender, the Receiver, and in the case of Intercept-Resend cyber-attack – the Eavesdropper. For the simplicity of
implementation, we wrote Mutually Unbiased Bases (MUB) as follows:
A = Z − MUB
B = X − MUB
C = Y − MUB (4)
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Fig. 1. The sender and the receiver interfaces.
Each of the 12 vectors of the bases were marked with letters from a to l. Taking into account the fact that each of the
twelve vectors can carry two-bit classical information, the Sender and the Receiver will establish some conventions
related to this classical information. It is obvious that, after the exchange of quantum systems, both parties will be in
possession of a raw key containing an even number of bits. The ﬁnal step of the protocol consists in a comparison
between the two sequences of bits possessed by the Sender and the Receiver after encoding and decoding, which is
made of two steps: secret key reconciliation and privacy ampliﬁcation.
Secret key reconciliation is a procedure of correction of the errors from the raw key, which eliminates:
• the errors generated by different choice of bases.
• the errors generated by eavesdropper.
• the errors generated by noises.
Secret key reconciliation realizes a binary interactive search of the errors. The Sender and the Receiver divide the
remaining sequence of bits (the raw key) in blocks of bits, and they will compare the parity of each block. If the parity
of a block of bits differs, the Receiver and the Sender will divide that block in smaller blocks, and they will compare
their parity.
In order to replace the practical devices of obtaining and transmitting the quantum systems, and of reading and
receiving them, respectively, were made two applications simulating Quantum Key Distribution with Four-State
Systems, and the behavior of the Sender, of the Receiver, and of the Eavesdropper (for the case of a cyber-attack).
3.1 Quantum Key Distribution with Four-State Systems – without eavesdropper
The application Quantum Key Distribution with Four-State Systems – without eavesdropper was developed for the
situation when the protocol develops securely, without the presence of an intruder.
Quantum Key Distribution protocol with Four-State Systems is efﬁcient because a quantum system with four-states
transports two classical bits10,11. Assume the convention established between the Sender and the Receiver as:
0 → 00; 1 → 01; 2 → 10; 3 → 11. (5)
The simulation ran on two interconnected computers two of the application modules: the Sender and the Receiver.
The connection between the computers was made by a UTP cable, simulating the quantum channel, as well as the
classical channel. In the research were not considered the errors appeared due to the equipment. The application was
tested on a variable number of input data (ququarts) and studied how the errors varied.
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Fig. 2. Values of QQqER and ﬁnal key depending on initial number of ququarts.
Fig. 3. Variation of the error according to the dimension of the input data.
In the Quantum Key Distribution with Four-State Systems protocol for establishing a secret key, the Sender
randomly chooses one of the 12 vectors and sends to the Receiver a ququart. To obtain the cryptographic key, both of
them will execute the stages of the quantum key distribution protocol: bases reconciliation, reconciliation and privacy
ampliﬁcation secret key.
The Receiver randomly chooses one of the three bases and measures the ququart, and then, publicly reveals which
basis he chose, but not the result he obtained. The Sender then reveals whether the ququart belongs to that basis. If it
does, the Sender and the Receiver share the knowledge of one ququart. If it does not, that transmission was useless.
After running 10 times the simulation application Quantum Key Distribution with Four-State Systems protocol – on
ideal case, we obtained the results (ﬁgure 2) for an initial key with sizes ranging from 160 to 2560 ququarts. In the case
of Quantum Key Distribution protocol with Four-State Systems, the Receiver needs to choose among the 3 measuring
bases, therefore the probability of choosing correctly is of 1/3. The error rate is around the value of 68.34%, regardless
of the number of ququarts used as initial data.
The ﬁnal key, obtained by any scheme of quantum key distribution can be used together with the algorithm of
one-time pad, to create a perfectly secure cipher.
3.2 Quantum key distribution with four-state systems – with eavesdropper
The theoretical and practical vulnerabilities of Quantum Key Distribution Systems (QKD) have always constituted
the main starting point of the methods of attack on these systems.
This part of the paper proposes the implementation of the software of Quantum Key Distribution with Four-State
Systems protocol – with eavesdropper, together with the data set obtained from running the application. The simulation
was realized with the help of a circuit containing 3 computers on which a module of the application was running, each
of them communicating by a switch.
The method of attack used by the enemy in the simulation program presented is Intercept-Resend method13.
70   Gabriela Mogos /  Procedia Computer Science  54 ( 2015 )  65 – 72 
Fig. 4. The intercept-resend attack.
Fig. 5. The sender – the eavesdropper interfaces. The intercept-resend attack.
The modules are written in C++ language, and the block diagram of hardware conﬁguration is presented in the
Fig. 4.
The software application is formed of 3 modules: the Sender, the Receiver and the Eavesdropper (for the
Intercept-Resend attack). The Intercept-Resend attack13 is the most common type of attack used on Quantum Key
Distribution Systems. The Eavesdropper interrupts the quantum channel, measures each ququart received from the
sender in one of the three measurement bases, which he had chosen randomly. Then he sends the ququarts read to the
Receiver, and he will replace the compromised ququarts with others, without leaving traces of the attack12.
The Sender will send ququarts by the quantum channel to the Receiver. The Eavesdropper will interrupt the quantum
channel, he will intercept the ququarts (four-state quantum systems) sent by the Sender, which he will read according
to the bases chosen by him, and he will send other ququarts to the Receiver, according to the bases chosen by the
Eavesdropper.
The Receiver will extract these ququarts from the quantum channel, and at the end of the quantum transmission,
the Sender and the Receiver will communicate on the classical channel, and they will perform the steps: bases
reconciliation, secret key reconciliation, and privacy ampliﬁcation.
The application was tested on a variable number of input data (ququarts), and studied how the errors varied.
After running 10 times the simulation program Quantum Key Distribution with Four-State Systems protocol – with
eavesdropper, were obtained the following results for an initial key with sizes ranging from 160 to 2560 ququarts,
shown in Fig. 7.
In the case of a cyber-attack, the Eavesdropper will send to the Receiver a part of the ququarts, only the ones which
he managed to measure, the rest of the ququarts being false.
On his turn, during the process of reconciliation Sender-Receiver, the Receiver will introduce his own error when
reading the ququarts, by randomly choosing the ququarts received from the Eavesdropper from the measurement bases.
At the end of the process, both the sender and the receiver will see that the percentage of errors from the key is very
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Fig. 6. The sender – the eavesdropper – the receiver interfaces. The attack.
Fig. 7. Values of errors and ﬁnal key depending on initial number of ququarts.
Fig. 8. Variation of the error according to the dimension of the input data.
big, which proves the existence of an intruder, and they will give up the protocol. According to the above results, the
error rate is around the value of 88.94%, regardless of the number of ququarts used as initial data.
4. Conclusions
The security of Quantum Key Distribution protocol was demonstrated only for mathematical models of quantum
cryptosystems. In practice, this unconditional security cannot be reached, due to technical imperfections of the devices
used for polarization, and reading of photon polarization, respectively, involved in quantum key exchange.
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Software implementation of QuantumKeyDistribution protocol with Four-State systems is another way to verify the
theoretical models: without and with cyber-attack. Can be noted that the results are in agreement with the theoretical
ones. The simplest method to detect the Intercept – Resend attacks on Quantum Key Distribution protocol with
Four-State systems is to measure the percentage of errors from the key. Consequently, for a simpler detection of the
intruders acting by Intercept-Resend attacks, the parties need to run the Quantum Key Distribution protocol for the
ideal case (secure communication environment), where the possible errors could be only due to the equipment. At the
end, the parties may establish a maximum admitted upper limit of these errors – QQqER (Quantum Ququarts ERror).
If the enemy intercepts the ququarts sent, both the sender and the receiver will notice the high value of error QQqER
obtained at the end of the reconciliation stage, which will determine them to give up, the protocol being compromised.
In the case of results obtained by running the applications Quantum Key Distribution with Four-State Systems
protocol, in ideal conditions (eavesdropper’s absence), the average value of error QQqER is 68.34%, while in
eavesdropper’s presence, the value of error QQqER reaches 88.94%.
In conclusion, the obtained results highlight the agreement between the theoretical model and the practical one in
what concerns the average error of each protocol.
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